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Abstract—As one of the representative Delegated Proof-of-
Stake (DPoS) blockchain platforms, EOSIO’s ecosystem grows
rapidly in recent years. A number of vulnerabilities and cor-
responding attacks of EOSIO’s smart contracts have been dis-
covered and observed in the wild, which caused a large amount
of financial damages. However, the majority of EOSIO’s smart
contracts are not open-sourced. As a result, the WebAssembly
code may become the only available object to be analyzed in most
cases. Unfortunately, current tools are web-application oriented
and cannot be applied to EOSIO WebAssembly code directly,
which makes it more difficult to detect vulnerabilities from those
smart contracts. In this paper, we propose EVulHunter, a static
analysis tool that can be used to detect vulnerabilities from
EOSIO WASM code automatically. We focus on one particular
type of vulnerabilities named fake-transfer, and the exploitation
of such vulnerabilities has led to millions of dollars in damages.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to build
an automatic tool to detect vulnerabilities of EOSIO’s smart
contracts. The experimental results demonstrate that our tool is
able to detect fake transfer vulnerabilities quickly and precisely.
EVulHunter is available on GitHub1 and YouTube2.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing prosperity of cryptocurrencies like Bit-
coin, blockchain techniques has become more attractive and
been adopted by different aeras, such as financial and logistical
systems. Due to the limited throughput (e.g., Transaction Per
Second, aka TPS) derived from the essence of the Proof-
of-Work (PoW) consensus, traditional blockchain platforms
(e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum), cannot be used to support high-
performing applications. Researchers proposed different con-
sensuses, such as Proof-of-Share (PoS) and Delegated Proof-
of-Stake (DPoS), to resolve the performance issue.
As one of the most representative DPoS platforms and the
first decentralized operating system, EOSIO [2] has become
one of the most active communities all over the world.
EOSIO adopts a multi-threaded mechanism based on its DPoS
consensus protocol [6]. EOSIO claims that it is capable of
achieving millions of TPS. The main native token of EOSIO is
called EOS. The amount of EOS tokens of the holders are used
to allocate system resources (e.g., bandwidth and storage), vote
and participate in the on-chain governance, according to the
corresponding proportion of the total stake. Briefly speaking,
21 Block Producers (BPs) are voted during its launch, and a
validate block is generated every 500 ms block time by those
BPs in a round-robin schedule.
1Tool and benchmarks: https://github.com/EVulHunter/EVulHunter
2Demo video: https://youtu.be/5SJ0ZJKVZvw
Smart contract is a computer protocol which allows users
to digitally negotiate an agreement in a convenient and secure
way [3]. In contrast to the traditional contract law, the transac-
tion costs of the smart contract are dramatically reduced, and
the correctness of its execution is ensured by the consensus
protocol. EOSIO’s smart contracts can be written in C++ ,
which will be compiled down to WebAssembly (aka WASM)
and executed in EOSIO WASM virtual machine. WASM is a
web standards specifying the binary instruction format for a
stack-based virtual machine, and it can be run in modern web
browsers and other environments [5].
However, it is not easy to guarantee the security of the
implementation of smart contracts, new platforms in partic-
ular. A number of vulnerabilities have been discovered from
EOSIO’s smart contracts, including fake EOS transfer, fake
transfer notice and flawed random numbers generators. As
such, severe attacks have been observed in the wild, which
caused a large amount of financial damages.
Unfortunately, most Decentralized Applications (DApps)
projects on EOSIO are not open-sourced, while the web-
application oriented analyzed tools cannot be applied to EO-
SIO WASM code directly, which makes it more difficult to
detect vulnerabilities from those smart contracts. Specifically,
there does exist two major challenges must be overcome.
First of all, since the EOSIO WASM code does not contain
context information (e.g., symbols, function names and type
information), we have to infer the indexes of the functions
we are interested in, including relevant system functions and
functions implemented by the developer. Secondly, the Con-
tract Development Toolkit (CDT) of EOSIO has been evolving
ever since the launch of the mainnet, and we have to cover
variants because of the changes caused by CDT(s).
In this paper, we propose a static analysis tool named
EVulHunter which can be used to detect vulnerabilities from
EOSIO WASM code automatically. Specifically, it first tra-
verses the WASM code and constructs the corresponding
Control Flow Graphs (CFGs), and then detects the existence of
vulnerabilities based on predefined patterns. To facilitate the
deep analyses, EVulHunter also contains a WASM Simulator
module which is capable of performing the simulated code
execution. Besides, we focus on one particular type of vul-
nerabilities named fake-transfer with two variants, fake EOS
transfer and fake transfer notice. The exploitation of fake-
transfer vulnerability has led to millions of dollars in damages
from gambling DApps.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt
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to build an automatic tool to detect vulnerabilities of EOSIO’s
smart contracts. The experimental results demonstrate that
our system is able to detect target vulnerabilities quickly and
precisely with low false positives. Our efforts can positively
shed some light on the exploration of vulnerability detection
of EOSIO’s smart contracts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EOSIO’s Smart Contract
In EOSIO, an action (a base32 encoded 64-bit integer)
is used to represent a single operation, which can be sent
individually, or in a combined form, to serve the purpose of
communication between a smart contact and an account [4].
A transaction is composed of one or more actions.
In order to handle requested actions, an apply function is
necessary to dispatch corresponding action handlers for any
validate smart contract. Specifically, apply function listens to
all incoming actions and execute the concrete action handlers
accordingly. To this end, the input parameters of apply func-
tion, i.e., the receiver (the account that is currently processing
the action), code (the account that authorized the contract),
and action (the ID of the currently running action), are used as
filters to map to the desired functions that implement particular
actions [4].
As one of the 5 fundamental smart contracts of EOSIO3,
eosio.token contract is a token standard (like Ethereum’s
ERC20 standard) contract which enables the creation of many
different tokens all running on the same contract but poten-
tially managed by different users [1]. It can be used to create,
issue and transfer tokens [4], and the transfer functionality is
related to the target fake-transfer vulnerabilities.
B. Fake-Transfer Vulnerabilities
Figure 1 shows the lifecycle of a transfer action. Firstly
a user sends the transfer action to the eosio.token contract.
After that, the eosio.token contract will modify the balances
accordingly, and then launch the following two invocations:
require recipient (from) and require recipient ( to ), from
and to are source account and destination account respectively.
Finally, if any account has been deployed with a contract, and
there does exist a pre-defined transfer action handler in this
contract, the handler would be invoked.
Fig. 1. The lifecycle of a transfer action.
3Namely EOSIO.contracts, i.e., eosio.bios, eosio.token, exchange, eo-
sio.msig, eosio.system
Fake EOS Transfer. As mentioned earlier, the code parameter
of the apply function represents the account that authorized the
contract. Obviously, the code parameter of the apply function
of the victim (i.e., the recipient to) should be eosio.token in a
normal transfer action. However, if an implementation of the
apply function did not verify the code parameter properly, it
might be deceived into receiving fake EOS tokens and then
executing the further code logic.
Fake EOS Notice. It is an advanced variant of fake-transfer
vulnerabilities with a well-implemented apply function. How-
ever, two parameters of the transfer function, i.e., to and self,
have not been checked for equality. Specifically, the attacker
was able to create an intermediate contract that forwarding the
incoming transfer action to the victim contract. As such, the
victim contract would be misled into believing it was receiving
EOS tokens.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we will first introduce the overall design
of the proposed EVulHunter system, and then depict each
component individually.
Fig. 2. Overview of EVulHunter.
A. Overview
Figure 2 illustrates the framework of the proposed system,
which accepts the EOSIO WASM code as the input. EVul-
Hunter is composed of three modules, including CFG Builder,
WASM Simulator and Detector Engine.
We first build the CFGs based on Octopus4, an open source
project that is able to parse EOSIO WASM code. Specifically,
the CFGs of the apply function will be generated in our
CFG builder. After that, the entire CFGs will go through the
Detector Engine module. To facilitate the analyses, specific
Basic Blocks (BBs) might be selected to be executed by
the WASM Simulator on demand, where the stack the linear
memory would be rebuilt to serve the purpose.
We will describe WASM Simulator and Detector Engine in
the following subsections, III-B and III-C respectively.
B. WASM Simulator
WASM Simulator is designed to be a simple, concise and
generic Virtual Machine (VM) to support further analyses
with high extensibility. Basically, this VM keeps a Stack
and Memory structure, which will be modified during tracing
4https://github.com/quoscient/octopus
instructions of the WASM code. To facilitate the analysis,
several special patterns have been observed and summarized,
including self, from, to and strings in a format of 32-bit
encoding integer, so that the simulator is able to recover the
semantic type information by mimicking the code execution.
For example, get local 7 means a popped value from the stack
will be assigned to a variable named local7, even without the
knowledge of the value type. After simulated execution, it is
possible to determine that local7 represents a base32 encoded
64-bit integer and is exactly the “eosio.token” in the context.
Locating Indirect Call Functions. The WASM Simulator can
be used to locate indirect call functions in the apply function,
which is the first challenge mentioned in Section I. Specifi-
cally, the link between the apply function and the target func-
tion is implemented with the indirect call mechanism by using
an API named execute action () in all the versions of CDT.
Although different CDT may have different implementations,
the invariant feature is that the indirect call function pointer
is always the last parameter of the execute action () function.
As the top item in the stack is always the index number of
the indirect call function when calling execute action , we can
use this feature to determine the indexes of the functions in
the corresponding WASM code.
C. Detector Engine
All detectors are wrapped in the Detector Engine module,
which may conduct deep analyses by interacting with the
WASM Simulator when necessary. We have implemented
two detectors for fake EOS transfer and fake transfer notice
vulnerabilities respectively, as follows:
• In case of fake EOS transfer, if none of the functions pre-
defined by the developer is likely to be invoked when
the incoming action is not authorized by eosio.token,
which further suggests that the transfer function won’t
be invoked as well, therefore it is not vulnerable to fake
EOS transfer vulnerability; otherwise it is tagged as a
vulnerable contract.
• In case of fake transfer notice, if there exists a comparison
between to and self in the transfer function, it is not
vulnerable to fake transfer notice vulnerability; otherwise
it is tagged as a vulnerable contract.
Covering Variants. We have to handle two types of variants.
Firstly, variants derived from the the evolutions of CDT.
Secondly, variants come from one specific verion of CDT,
by which even the same logic might be served by different
groups of WASM instructions. We have tried our best to
summarize and cover cases as many as possible, if not all,
to make the detectors robust and complete. All variants being
analyzed are summarized in Fig. 3, including comparison
patterns, comparison pairs and corresponding descriptions of
elements being compared shown in elliptical boxes. There are
3 comparison patterns and 2 comparison pairs respectively,
implying 6 combinations in total.
Fig. 3. Summary of Covering Variants.
TABLE I
THE DISTRIBUTION OF OUR BENCHMARK.
# Vulnerable # Non-vulnerable # Total
Fake EOS Transfer 75 109 184
Fake EOS Notice 141 54 195
Total 159 82 241
IV. EVALUATION
A. Benchmark
It appear that no available benchmarks on vulnerable EOS
smart contracts in our community could be used for evaluation.
Thus, we propose to manually craft a benchmark from the
known reported vulnerable Dapps5. For example, it is reported
that EOSBet contract was attacked by exploiting the fake EOS
transfer vulnerability in September 2018, and it suffered from
the fake EOS notice vulnerability in October 2018. In this way,
we seek to identify the corresponding vulnerable versions of
the reported smart contracts, and then collect the patched ones
with no vulnerabilities.
At last, we have collected 241 EOS smart contracts in total
(with 159 vulnerable ones), 184 of them were used as the
benchmark of fake EOS transfer vulnerability, and 195 of
them were used to evaluate the fake EOS notice vulnerability
detection. The distribution of our benchmark is shown in
Table I. Note that one smart contract could have both fake
EOS transfer and fake EOS notice vulnerabilities.
B. Detection Result
Overall Result. Table II shows the overall detection result.
For the fake EOS transfer vulnerability, our tool could achieve
an overall accuracy of 86%, while for the fake EOS notice
vulnerability, we could achieve an overall accuracy of 100%.
This result suggests that EVulHunter is able to detect the fake
notice vulnerabilities with high precision and recall. No false
negatives were found in our evaluation, while 26 false positives
were found when detecting fake EOS transfer vulnerability.
False Positives. We have conducted a manual investigation
for all the 26 false positives, which were finally attributed to
the history versions of contract “eosbetdice11”. Specifically,
besides the account eosio.token, these contracts acknowledge
the legality of an extra account named eosbettokens 6, which
breaks our rules introduced in III-C.
5https://github.com/peckshield/EOS/tree/master/known dapp attacks
6Probably related to tokens they issued to support their own business.
TABLE II
THE OVERALL EXPERIMENT RESULT.
True Positive False Positive True Negative False Negative Precision Recall Accuracy
Fake EOS Transfer 75 26 83 0 74.26% 100% 85.87%
Fake EOS Notice 141 0 54 0 100% 100% 100%
Total 216 26 137 0 89.26% 100% 93.14%
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Fig. 4. The Performance Evaluation of EVulHunter.
In EOSIO platform, any account can deploy a token con-
tract, however, it is not trivial for us to collect all possible
legal accounts in an anonymous audit. To alleviate this issue,
our system could be easily extended to support a whitelist
mechanism which allows developers to customize extra legal
accounts by themselves.
C. Performance
We further evaluate the performance of EVulHunter, e.g.,
the time cost to detect fake transfer vulnerabilities in a given
smart contracts. For the 242 smart contracts in our benchmark,
we have recorded the detection time of each contract, and then
analyzed the correlation between the size of smart contract and
the detection time.
As shown in Figure 4, it is obvious that time consumption of
vulnerability detection increased linearly with the increasing
of the size of smart contract, although the increasing rate is
very small. In general, the detection time rages from 1 second
to 3 seconds. This result suggests that EVulHunter is efficient
to flag the vulnerabilities in EOS smart contracts, which could
be easily scale to thousands of smart contracts.
V. RELATED WORK
The security vulnerabilities of smart contracts have attracted
great attention of our research community. However, almost all
of the previous studies focus on analyzing the vulnerabilities
in the Ethereum smart contracts [7]–[12], as a large number of
smart contracts in the Ethereum ecosystem are open-sourced,
and a number of analyzing tools could be leveraged. For ex-
ample, Liu et al. [9] presented an analyzer aimed at reentrancy,
the type of vulnerability which cause ‘TheDAO’ hard fork on
Ethereum. Atzei et al. [7] covered more security vulnerabilities
and showed a series of attack which allow attacker to steal
money from smart contract. Luu et al. [10] built a sysbolic
execution tool to find potential security bugs. Tikhomirov et
al. [11] provided a static analysis tool to detect problematic
language constructs. Our work is the first attempt to detect
fake transfer vulnerabilities for EOSIO’s smart contracts. We
believe our efforts could shed some light on the detection of
vulnerabilities in the EOSIO’s smart contracts.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present the first systematic attempt to
automatically detect fake-transfer vulnerabilities from EO-
SIO WASM code. Specifically, it first traverses the WASM
code and constructs the corresponding Control Flow Graphs
(CFGs), and then detects the existence of vulnerabilities based
on predefined patterns. The evaluation results demonstrate the
system performance, including speed and accuracy.
There are a number of future lines of work we will explore.
For example, our detection simply relies on constant patterns,
which may not be suitable to model the characteristics of other
types of vulnerabilities. As such, some advanced program
analysis techniques (e.g., symbolic execution) could be used
to achieve more accurate results. To this end, we may have
to revise the design of our system to support advanced anal-
yses. Despite the limitations, we still believe our efforts and
observations could positively contribute to the community.
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